Citation link:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:467-4076
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Söbbing, Thomas | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-02T09:57:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-11-4T12:12:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-09-02T09:57:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Die Forschungsarbeit beschäftigt sich damit, ob es vergleichende Verhaltensweise bei politischen Verhandlungsführer, wie auch bei juristisch Ökomenischen Verhandlungsführern gibt, die zum Scheitern von Vertragsverhandlungen führen. | de |
dc.description.abstract | The scientific work makes a comparison between policy and economy / law. He asks: "is there the same behaviour between policy negotiators and negotiators of economy to failure the negotiation of contracts?" | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.ub.uni-siegen.de/handle/ubsi/407 | - |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hbz:467-4076 | - |
dc.language.iso | de | de |
dc.rights.uri | https://dspace.ub.uni-siegen.de/static/license.txt | de |
dc.subject.ddc | 320 Politik | de |
dc.subject.other | Vertragsverhandlungen | de |
dc.subject.swb | Outsourcing | de |
dc.subject.swb | Mergers and Acquisitions | de |
dc.subject.swb | Scheitern | de |
dc.title | Warum scheitern Vertragsverhandlungen? : ein politischer und ökonomisch-juristischer Vergleich | de |
dc.title.alternative | Why negations of contracts are failure? : a scientific comparison between policy and economy / law | en |
dc.type | Doctoral Thesis | de |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
ubsi.date.accepted | 2009-07-22 | - |
ubsi.publication.affiliation | Fachbereich 1, Sozialwissenschaften - Philosophie - Theologie - Geschichte - Geographie | de |
ubsi.subject.ghbs | OVG | - |
ubsi.type.version | publishedVersion | de |
Appears in Collections: | Hochschulschriften |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
soebbing.pdf | 2.94 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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